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GAME THEORY'S WARTIME CONNECTIONS 
AND T H E  STUDY OF 
INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT 
GERD KORMAN and MICHAEI, KLAPPER 
I N 1964, when Richard E. Walton and Rob- ert B. McKersie finished their landmark 
work, A Behauioral Theory  of Labor Nego-  
tiatzons: A n  Analysis of a Social Interaction 
System, game theory, an important feature 
of their work, had been around for at least 
twenty years.' It had surfaced in the midst of 
World War 11, and during the Cold War it 
had become a significant analytical tool not 
only for military analysts but also for op- 
ponents of war, who tried to develop general 
theories or systems that would explain con- 
flict scientifically. Those students of game 
theory had helped to make it increasingly at- 
tractive to scholars in the field of labor rela- 
tions who wanted to improve their under- 
standing of industrial conflict. 
This  study traces the changing reactions to game 
theory of scholars interested in  the stud>- of industrial 
conflict, from the inception of the theor>- in  the early 
1940s to its acceptance by many in  the 1960s. T h e  
authors recapitulate the vietvs of proponents and 
critics of the theory and emphasize the effect of \Vorld 
War I1 and the Cold War o n  that debate. They also 
describe the role of individuals such as Kenneth 
Boulding and  Thomas  Schelling and of institutions 
such as the RAND Corporation and the Ford Founda- 
tion's Center for Advanced Study i n  the Behavioral 
Sciences. 
Gerd Korman is Associate Professor at  the S e w  York 
State School of Industrial and Labor Relations and 
Michael Klapper is a recent g a d u a t e  of the S e w  York 
University Law School.-EDITOR 
'Richard E. M'alton and Robert B. McKersie, A Be- 
havioral Theory of Labor ~Vegotiatzons: A n  Analyszs 
of a Soczal Interactzon System (New York: h'lcGraw- 
Hill, 1965). 
Game theory never did become the theory 
of choice of those students of industrialcon- 
flict weaned on institutional economics, but 
its wartime connections with students of 
war and peace are worthy of exploration. It 
was one of a number of quantitative analy- 
ses associated with the emerging breed of 
behavioral scientists and general systems 
analysts, true believers who had arrived on 
the scene when a strange environment en- 
veloped the republic. It was a period of Man- 
ichean years. Gods of war ruled public pas- 
sions. Americans considered themselves 
locked in a fatal struggle with the forces of 
evil in Germany, Japan, and then in Soviet 
Russia. All but a few citizens endorsed the 
extraordinary centralization of authority by 
the federal executive. On a scale never 
reached before, government officials and 
their experts used theories and quantitative 
techniques to calculate-and, Jacques Ellul 
would insist, to think-in an artificial sta- 
tistical atmo~phere.~ The focus on game 
theory and its wartime connections may 
therefore offer useful insights to the place of 
World LYar I1 and the Cold War in the devel- 
opment of analytical theories and methods 
that became important to a growing number 
of outstanding students in the field of indus- 
trial and labor relations. 
2Jacques Ellul, T h e  Technologzcal Soczet) (Nen 
l ork Iinopf, 1964), p 163 For a good introduction to 
American societ) during Lt'orld War I1 and the Cold 
Lt'ar, see \l illiam E Leuchtenburg, et a1 , T h e  L n-  
fznzshed Century (Boston Little, B i o r n ,  1973), p p  
526-69, 677-747 
Indust~ial  nrld Ln17oi Relntzonr Reiieru, 1.01 32, 10 1 (October 1978) b\ Cornell I T n ~ ~ e i s l t ~  
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College of Social Physicians 
Traditional students of domes tic conflict, 
connected to the engines of Marshall or 
Commons, had over many years fashioned 
an approach intended to stabilize labor- 
capital conflict for the sake of gradual, mod- 
erate reform. Ever since 1871, when radical 
rhetoric and the thousands killed in the 
fight over the Paris Commune made the 
specter of industrial class warfare a horrible 
reality, uncontrolled labor-capital conflict 
became the nightmare for city dwellers who 
saw America's future tied to industrializa- 
tion instead of commerce or agriculture. In 
the United States, the violence of railroad 
strikes between 1874 and 1877, the explosion 
of organized worker power in 1886, and 
Homestead, Coeur d'Alene, and Pullman a 
few years later evoked sufficient fear from 
elected officials and masters of factories, 
railroads, and mines to use troops, then and 
later, for reestablishing the proper public 
peace. 
The nightmare also haunted social sci- 
entists for whom industrial events had par- 
ticular interest. Their professional thinking 
intertwined with all sorts of concepts and 
facts of personal history and of the society in 
which they lived. They respondedespecially 
to ideas and innovations associated with 
entrepreneurial liberty, various forms of 
Darwinism, and reforms of the progressive 
movement, and to the rules and regulations 
of World War I. But among American politi- 
cal economists who wanted to contain con- 
flict between workers and their employers, 
two Danvinians served as master teachers: 
Marshall in England, and Commons in the 
United States. The two eschewed niathe- 
matics and statistics in their published 
work; they wanted to be useful and to serve 
the public interest; they wanted to institu- 
tionalize an invisible college of social physi- 
cians eager to help a democratic society im- 
prove itself; and they knew that uncon- 
trolled internal conflict of industrial capi- 
talism stood in their way, that it beckoned 
employer tyranny, class warfare, authori- 
tarian governments, or socia l i~m.~ 
jArthur C. Pigou, ed., !\.lemorzals of Alfred !\.larshall 
(London: Macmillan, 1925), pp. 23-24, 66-67, 427; 
Arthur C. Pigou, Alfred Marshall and Current 
The master teachers and those who came 
under their influence criticized each other 
and were subject to diverse attacks from out- 
side their circles. The radical critics of in- 
dustrial capitalism did not usually distin- 
guish between Manchester and bladison and 
accused all as defenders of the system. Re- 
formers, including Commons, charged the 
classical school of Marshall with deductive 
rigidity, with a belief in disembodied eco- 
nomic forces, moving inexorably by their 
own rules and working principally on indi- 
viduals, and with opposition to redistrib- 
uting income and power in capitalist Amer- 
ica. Devotees of entrepreneurial liberty 
accused Commons and his students of con- 
stituting threats to that same system because 
they supported a trade union movement 
built around the national union and indus- 
trial democracy, because they wanted state 
legislatures to pass protective labor legis- 
lation, and because they fought for national 
social insurance programs intended to pre- 
vent economic hardship. 
Commons's institutional economics was 
especially porous because of his arrogant 
presumptions about race and American 
nationalism as governing elernents in be- 
havior, but his collegial opponents usually 
focused upon his understanding of eco- 
nomics. For Commons the human will in 
action precluded economics from becoming 
one of the physical sciences. T o  him and his 
students clinical economists studied power 
relationships as they occurred among free 
individuals and voluntary groups partici- 
pating in transactions that constituted all of 
economic a c t i ~ i t y . ~  T o  theoretical and 
quantitatively oriented opponents, clinical 
economists were akin to humanists who 
T h o u g h t  (London: hlacmillan, 1953), pp. 7, 10, 11; 
J.  K. ll'hitakker, ed., T h e  Early Economzc It'ritzngs of 
'4lfrcd hfarshall,  1567-1590 (London: Royal Economic 
Society, 1975), pp. 341-77; H. J .  Dyos and Michael 
ll'olff, eds., T h e  Victorian City (London: Routledge, 
1973), pp. 27-28, and 88 f f .  provides background for 
Marshall's urban world in England. For Commons, 
see Gerd Korman, "John R. Commons," Dictionary 
of American Biography, Supplementary Volume 111, 
pp. 176-80. 
4Korman, "John R .  Commons," pp. 176-80. 
'John R. Commons, Institutional Economics: Its 
Place in  Political Economy (New York: hlacmillan, 
1934), pp. 55 ff . ,  73, 88. 
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stressed the particular, doted on qualitative 
uniqueness, relied on so-called anecdotal 
evidence, and considered beyond measure- 
ment and testing the complex webs of hu- 
man behavior.6 
Game Theory's Arrival 
Between World Wars I and 11, the search 
for means of stabilizing conflict continued 
under changed circumstances and with new 
concepts. Some social scientists insisted that 
the price at which quantities could be ex- 
changed was indeterminate. They thought 
it would be impossible to apply the analyt- 
ical tools of the economist to yield more than 
an approximation; they argued that power, 
impervious to economic analysis, played a 
decisive role over the course of negotiations. 
But others began to feel that a model could 
be constructed that would lead to a solution 
of the distribution problem; they thought 
power could be analyzed by economic 
theory. 
In the 1930s, when ideological passions, 
mass production unions, and industrial 
conflict dotted the landscape, John Hicks, 
in England, and those of like mind in the 
United States, examined wage determina- 
tion from the perspective of that decade. 
They assumed that both the power of an 
employer and that of the union government 
could be analyzed by applying economic 
theories to the ways each related to wages. 
By the eve of World War I1 they had suc- 
ceeded in contracting the zone of indeter- 
minancy but, as they themselves admitted, 
part of that zone remained open.' 
Students of conflict also considered other 
competing theories. Some insisted the firm 
was an economic model for trade unions. 
6Pigou,  !\.larshall and Current T h o u g h t ,  pp.  10, 11; 
P igou ,  Memorials of i2farshall, pp.  23-24, 66-67. For a 
general discussion o f  these controversies, see Joseph  
D o r f m a n ,  T h e  Economic ,%fznd i n  American Civzliza- 
t ion,  1865-1918, 1'01. 3 [Repr in t ]  ( N e w  Y o r k :  A. M .  
Kelley, 1969), pp.  359-90, and Ben  B .  Seligram, Main 
Currents i n  Modern Economics  (Glencoe,  Ill.: Free 
Press, 1963), pp.  628-65. 
7 J o h n  R .  Hicks ,  ed., T h e  Theory of W a g e s ( L o n d o n :  
Macmil lan,  1932), pp.  i x ,  140-46, 152-56; Martin S .  
Bronfenbrenner ,  " T h e  Economics  o f  Collective Bar- 
gaining," Quarterly Journal of Economics ,  V o l .  53, 
N o .  4 ( A u g u s t  1939), pp. 535-61. 
0 thers, who stressed the union as a political 
institution, were especially concerned about 
the place of political behavior in economic 
conflict and in the process of bureaucratiza- 
tion, subjects that remained important in 
postwar years8 There were also social scien- 
tists, who were not economists, who studed 
bargaining. Involved with theories of psy- 
chology and behavior, they used statistics or 
mathematical theory in their studies. Some 
of them looked back to the critics of Hicks 
and to startingpoints different from those of 
Marshall or Commons. Frederick Zeuthen, 
an economist in Denmark, reached back to 
Augustine Cournot, a nineteenth century 
economist who had used mathematical 
theory. Offering a psychological model of 
the bargaining process, Zeuthen insisted 
that the economic, political, and psycho- 
logical components of that process could be 
analyzed and expressed quantitatively. He 
justified his approach this way: 
Deduction takes place according to the rules of 
logic and, since in all essentials economics is con- 
cerned with the nature of the connection between 
quantities, this science must to a great extent 
apply quantitative logic, i.e. mathematics. This 
does not require that formulae and figures are go- 
ing to occupy very much space. Logical verbal 
reasoning about quantities (without inter- 
mingling of irrelevant words) is also included in 
mat he ma tic^.^ 
During the interwar years social scientists 
8See, for example ,  Sumner  Slichter, Economzc 
Factors Affecting Industrzal Relations Policy zn the  
War  Period ( N e w  Y o r k :  Industrial Relations C o u n -  
selors, 1939) and U n i o n  Policies and Industrial Man-  
agement  (\\'ashington: Brookings Institute, 1941), pp.  
i x -x i v ,  371; Arthur  Ross ,  " T h e  Trade  U n i o n  as a \\'age 
Fixing Institution," Amerzcan Economic Review,  V o l .  
37, N o .  4 (September 1947), pp.  571-87; and " T h e  
Dynamics  o f  W a g e  Determination Under  Collective 
Bargaining," American Economic Review,  1'01. 37, 
N o .  5 (December 1947), p. 882; J o h n  T .  D u n l o p ,  Wage  
Determinatzon Under Trade Unions ,  2d. ed .  ( S e w  
Y o r k :  Macmil lan,  1950), p. 27; and J .  Douglas Brown ,  
T h e  Industrzal Relations Sectzon of Princeton Cniver-  
sity i n  World War  I I :  A Personal Account (Princeton:  
I R S ,  1976). 
gFrederick Zeuthen,  Problems of iZfonopoly and 
Economic  Warfare [Repr in t ]  ( N e w  Y o r k :  A .  M. Kelley, 
1968), pp.  3 ,  25, 64, 65, 104-21. See also Frederick 
Zeuthen,  Economic Theory and Method (Cambridge:  
Harvard Univers i ty  Press, 1955), pp. 6-10 (quo ta t ion  
f r o m  p. 17) ,  and Gerard Shove's review o f  Hicks's T h e  
Theory of Wages (1932 edi t ion)  i n  Hicks ,  T h e  Theory 
of Wages (1963), pp.  249-65. 
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with Zeuthen's orientation had important 
intellectual company. It was a period when 
political ideologies of assimilation, social- 
ism, fascism, and Communism strove to 
control and make predictable the behavior 
of masses of people by eliminating differ- 
ences among individual and cultural groups 
for the sake of the will of the nation, the 
state, or the industrial working class. It was 
also a time when the implications of the 
work of Erwin Schroedinger, Albert Ein- 
stein, and Neils Bohr came to be felt outside 
their world of quantum mechanics and 
other aspects of theoretical physics. Statis- 
tics and mathematics had become of in- 
creasing importance to other scholars seek- 
ing to understand intersecting problems 
originating in economics and such other 
subjects as organismic biology, psychology, 
sociology, quality control, and manage- 
ment analysis.1° 
John von Neumann, the chemical engi- 
neer from Budapest, read his seminal paper 
on game theory to the Mathematics Society 
at Goettingen, Germany in 1928 and soon 
after wrote some of his papers on the logic 
design of computers, turning in part to 
biology and in part to physiologists Warren 
S. McCullock and Walter Pitts, who were 
trying to make a mathematical model of the 
human nervous system. In the meantime in 
Austria, Oskar Morgenstern sought to trans- 
cend the limitations of traditional economic 
analysis. With German National Socialists 
infesting his world of scholarship with 
supercharged political theology, he wrote 
an essay focusing attention upon the "meth- 
odological controversy and the discussion of 
the neutrality of economics as between dif- 
ferent value judgments." Morgens tern also 
wanted "to reduce the level of abstraction of 
the theory of wages by the insertion of con- 
loJames D. Watson, T h e  Double Helzx (New York: 
Atheneum, 19681, pp. 13-14, 15, 22-23, 192; Richard B. 
Goldschmidt, "The Impact of Genetics Upon Sci- 
ence," G.  M'. Beadle, "Chemical Genetics," and Boris 
Ephrussi, "Remarks on Cell Heredity," all three in 
L. C. Dunn, ed., Genetics i n  the Twentzeth Century 
(New York: hlacmillan, 19511, pp. 22-23, 236, 237, 
243-44; Gerald Holton, "The Roots of Complemen- 
tarity," Daedalus, Vol. 99, No. 4 (Fall 19701, pp. 1015- 
55 and Robert Olby, "Francis Crick, DNA, and the 
Central Dogma," Daedalus, Vol. 99, No. 4 (Fall 19701, 
pp.  938-87. 
Crete data." But keeping economics free 
from value judgments was not so important 
to him as was scholarly "independence." He 
wanted to eliminate all barriers of dogmatic 
presumption that affected the economist's 
explanation of cause and effect." 
At Princeton between 1939 and 1944, 
building on von Neumann's earlier paper, 
von Neumann and Morgenstern developed 
their original model for problem-solving 
situations. As quantum mechanics and 
organismic biology had done before, game 
theory assumed different "habits of behavior 
that cannot be changed simultaneously and 
that can usually be counted on to remain 
unchanged."lZ In their treatise, Theory of 
Games and Economic Behavior, the authors 
argued against social scientists such as Com- 
mons who objected to the creation of paral- 
lels between the physical sciences and their 
disciplines. They drew extensively from 
elementary notions of physics. Past failures 
in applying mathematics to conflict and 
tension in economics did not impress them. 
Economic questions had not been formu- 
lated clearly and were often stated in "such 
vague terms as to make mathematical treat- 
ment a priori appear hopeless." Obviously 
there was no point in using exact methods if 
there was no "clarity in the concepts and 
issues to which they are to be applied." They 
implied disagreement with Marshall when 
they insisted that mathematics involved 
more than translating verbal expressions 
into symbols.13 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern's inter- 
war gestation years had led them to an un- 
common breed of camel, and in the midst of 
war, they tried to push its head into the tents 
of the economics profession. They en- 
"Oskar Morgenstern, T h e  L imi t s  of Economzcs, 
translated by Vera Smith (London: !V. Hodge, 19371, 
pp .  137, 153-55; Seligman, ,ZIain Currents, pp. 772-79, 
789; Jeremy Bernstein, "'IVhen the Computer Pro- 
creates," 'Yew York  T i m e s  Magazine, February 15, 
1976, pp.  9, 34-38, Von Neumann's paper, "Zur Theo- 
rie der Gesellschaffspiele," was published in Mathe- 
matische Annalen,  Vol. 100 (19281, pp. 295-320. 
I2Ernest Nagel, T h e  Structure of Science: Problems 
i n  the Logic  of Sczentific Exploration (New York: Har- 
court, 1961), p. 473. 
I3John von Neumann and Oskar hlorgenstern, 
Theory of Games and Economic Behauior (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1944), pp. i ,  3, 4. 
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countered opposition, partially because 
economists were forced at that point to 
decide if game theory revealed and filled a 
cultural gap in the empirical realm of eco- 
nomics. "Of course, mathematics was no 
stranger to economics," explained Ben B. 
Seligrnan some years later, "but, up  to this 
point major reliance had been placed on the 
infinitesimal calculus. . . .Game theory ven- 
tured into a relatively new realm of mathe- 
matics . . . it was a kind of mathematics sel- 
dom seen in economics with concepts drawn 
f~ om theory, group theory, and mathe- 
matical logic."14 There were some public 
supporters-Jacob Marschak was one-but 
most economists involved with problems of 
conflict left the camel in splendid isolation. 
Martin Shubik thought most of his tradi- 
tional colleagues left Theory of Games and 
Economzc Behauzor alone because they 
would not or could not read it.l5 Some, how- 
ever, gave it serious consideration before 
rejecting it or connecting it to earlier pat- 
terns of economic thought about conflict. 
The book was rejected as inadequate on 
theoretical grounds or attacked because it 
made assumptions about economic be- 
havior that critics insisted contradicted 
experience. Carl Kaysen, for example, at- 
tacked the applicability of the most basic 
tenets of game theory to economics. The 
relationship between the value of the game 
described by von Neumann and Morgen- 
stern and the effects of relative "bargaining 
power" was never explicitly developed in 
the theory. Kaysen seemed to think that 
game theorists would profit from acquain- 
tance with the multiplicity of bargaining 
forces that lead to a given solution, forces 
exemplified in the seemingly outdated an- 
alysis of the length of strikes inHicks's The- 
ory of Wages. In any event, Kaysen con- 
cluded, "this new method of analysis does 
not represent the revolution in economic 
theory which its authors (and Professor 
I4Seligman, ,\.lazn Currents, p.  773. 
15Jacob AIarschak, "[VOII] Neumann's and  A'Iorgen- 
stern's S e w  Approach to Static Economics," Journal 
of Polztzcal Economy, 1.01. 54, No.  2 (April 1946), pp .  
114-15; Martin Shubik, "Information, Theories of 
Competition, and the Theory of Games," Journal of 
Political Economy, 1'01. 60, No. 2 (April 1952), p .  147; 
hlartin Shubik, "The Role of Game Theory in Eco- 
nomics," Kyklos, 1'01. 6, Fasc. 1 (1953.541, p p .  21-22. 
NIarschak) think it does."16 
In 1952 Seligman, a history-conscious 
economist, examined the von Neumann- 
Morgenstern approach to game theory and 
found that many of its ideas seemed con- 
sistent with those of "non-mathematical 
economists" whose experience since the 
1890s came from the field of labor relations. 
Commons had been concerned with trans- 
actions as the starting point of economic 
action. He framed analysis in terms of the 
fixed sum of national income and the shift- 
ing composition of groups contending for 
it. Seligman found an obvious similarity in 
the game theorists' approach to coalition 
forma tion. 
. . . game theory, with its emphasis on the el- 
ements of futurity and instability, calls attention 
to the urgent need to sustain in our system an 
equality of bargaining strength. If the scales shift 
away from such an equilibrium, the price that 
most of us would pay can very well be measured 
in political terms-in the language of game 
theory, in the loss of the right to be a recipient in 
the distribution of the winnings.17 
Unable to make the dramatic impact 
upon economic theory they had envisioned, 
von Neumann and klorgenstern looked 
elsewhere. One of their students explained: 
"The initial reaction of the economists to 
this work was one of greatreserve." Military 
scientists, on the other hand, "were quick to 
sense . . . [game theory] possibilities in their 
field."18 Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
pushed its development in the early months 
of the Cold \$Tar, especially in a new project 
called RAND, which was helping to attract 
civilians eager to attack the complex prob- 
lems of international relations in the post- 
war world. 
16Carl Kaysen, "A Revolution in Economic The- 
ory?" Revzew of Economzc Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1 
(1946-47), pp .  12-15 (quotation from pp .  14-15). See 
also David Champernowne, "A Note on  J .  'I'. Neu- 
mann's  Article on  'A hlodel of Economic Equilib- 
rium'," Revzew of Economic Studies, 'I'ol. 13, No. 1 
(1945-46), pp.  15, 17-18, 
"Ben B. Seligman, "Games Theory and Collective 
Bargaining," Labor and Natzon, 'I'ol. 8, No. 1 (Janu- 
ar)-March 1952), p p .  48-52. 
'@John D.  Il'illiams, T h e  Compleat Strategyst:Bezng 
a Primer zn the Theory of Games and Strategy (Nelv 
York: McGraw, 1954), p p ,  vii, 215,216-17. For a histor- 
ical survey of RAND, see Bruce L. R .  Smith, T h e  Rand 
Corporatzon (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1966), pp .  60-65. 
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The RAND-Ford Connection 
Game theory's entry to RAND became the 
critical link in the wartime connection 
between students of conflict worried about 
war and peace and students of industrial and 
labor relations. World War I1 had prepared 
the way for the event. The emphasis for 
comprehensive planning during the war 
had found interested parties outside labor 
economics and military circles. The Office 
of Scientific Research and Development 
(OSRD), a federal wartime agency estab- 
lished to bring clinical scholarship to mili- 
tary and industrial problems, had brought 
together civilians and soldiers under the 
leadership of M.I.T.'s Vannevar Bush and 
Karl T. Compton and Harvard's James P. 
Conant. The three had been close associates 
and all had reputations as successful organ- 
izers of American science. Possessed bv a 
sense of urgency, these men usually turned 
to 20 of the most successful universities and 
corporations and there, on contract, re- 
cr r ted  all sorts of scholars on behalf of the 
army and navy.lg Among its many activities, 
the agency organized experts for helping 
administrators make daily decisions and 
policy planners make judgments about the 
more distant future. ~es ides  recruiting von 
Neumann and others to the teams that built 
the first atomic bombs, OSRD also organ- 
- 
ized teams of mathematicians, statisticians, 
psychologists, sociologists, and economists. 
Increasingly, these civilians became part of 
work groups that included military men 
who wanted decisive answers about the dif- 
ferent effects of bombing, the use of fighter 
covers on long-distance air raids, ideal con- 
voys, or the behavior of soldiers and civilians 
in the lands of the enemy. Civilians were 
also needed for a subject Walter E. Stewart 
had studied for some years at Western Elec- 
tric: Statistical Quality Control-a process 
that was expected to speed up quality con- 
trol in the manufacture of munitions. Cap- 
tain G. L. Schuyler of the Bureau of Ordi- 
nance in the navy turned to the Statistical 
Research Group of Columbia University, 
which then included Milton Friedman and 
lgJohn M. Blum, V Was for Vzctory: Polztzcs and 
Amerzcan Culture Durtng World War I1 (New Yolk: 
Harcourt, 1976), pp .  114-45. 
Allen Wallis, to study the problem of se- 
quential analysis under the general direc- 
tion of the Applied Mathematics Panel of 
the National Defense Research Commit- 
tee.20 
At war's end, some of the work that had 
come under the jurisdiction of the Office of 
Research and Development had been con- 
tinued at Douglas Aircraft as Project RAND, 
as a result of a special agreement between 
General Hap Arnold of the U.S. Air Force 
and the management of the company. The 
bulk of RAND's work was directed toward 
mathematics, physics, and engineering, but 
as early as the winter of 1947 the clinical 
social sciences also began to take root. Schol- 
ars in universities and corporations turned 
to RAND as part of a natural habitat in 
which to continue work started during the 
war. But there were other reasons for 
RAND's attractiveness. General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, then Chief of Staff, expressed 
shared concerns as well as anybody. In 1946, 
for the General and Special Staff Divisions 
of the Army, he issueda memorandum call- 
ing for a national policy that would con- 
tinue the alliances fashioned during the war 
between soldiers and scholars: the "future 
security of the nation demands that all those 
civilian resources which bv conversion or 
reduction constitute our main support in 
time of emergency be associated with the 
activities of the Army in time of peace."21 
Questions of war and peace remained 
critical to these sorts of soldiers and civil- 
ians. As the Paris Commune had haunted an 
earlier generation, the specter of Hiroshima 
or Communist domination haunted these 
men returning to private life and others 
especially attracted to game theory or any 
other theory or tool seemingly capable of 
solving postwar problems. Project RAND 
at Douglas was one of the few places in the 
United States able to take advantage of their 
2oAbraham Wald, Sequential Analysis (Nelv York: 
Wiley, 19171, p. 2; S. Ulam, et al., "John von Neu- 
mann, 1903-1957," in Donald Fleming and Bernard 
Baylin, eds., T h e  Intellectual ilfzgration (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1969), pp.  235-18. O n  Stelz- 
art's pioneering work, see Daniel J .  Boorstin, T h e  
Democratic Experzence (New York: 'L'intage, 1974), 
pp. 195-200, 635. 
21Smith, Rand,  pp. 32n, 39, 41. 
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special interests, and so the Ford Founda- 
tion assisted RAND in becoming independ- 
ent. Ford trustees were receptive to a RAND 
appeal to transform the project at Douglas 
into a nonprofit enterprise. J .  Rowan 
Gaither-a San Francisco lawyer well con- 
nected to his city's financial circles, to 
RAND's management, and to the Ford 
Foundation's Board of Trustees-helped to 
bring the two organizations together. From 
banks in San Francisco Gaither received 
offers to put up $600,000 for the new RAND 
enterprise if the RAND people could pro- 
duce $400,000 of their own working capital; 
from Ford he obtained a $100,000 loan with- 
out interest and a guarantee for the other 
$300,000 needed to obtain the remainder of 
the working capital. Gaither himself be- 
came the influential head of RAND's Board 
of Trustees. RAND began its independent 
corporate life in relative secrecy with a con- 
tract from the air force.22 
The Ford Foundation's new creature had 
a broad and amorphous mission-to study 
"preferred techniques and instrumentali- 
ties of intercontinental warfare"; within 
that framework it generated a wealth of 
materials including pioneering "payoffs" 
for systems analysis, the "Monte Carlo" 
method, war gaming and simulation, and 
formal game theory. Between 1948 and 1962, 
the period of Gaither's chairmanship, 
RAND circulated approximately 300 pa- 
pers, reports, and research memoranda on 
game theory and its applications to logistics 
and national defense, both in limited war 
and nuclear confrontation. As early as 1953, 
von Neumann and klorgenstern acknowl- 
edged their debt to the RAND Corporation 
for its continuing efforts to build upon the 
theory that the authors had introduced. 
on a comparative study of treatments of 
duopoly; Marschak pursued the optional 
choice of weapons; and von Neumann con- 
tinued refinements on the theory of games.23 
Under Gaither's leadership the Ford 
Foundation also tried to channel thought 
and research into other problems of conflict 
resulting from the Cold TVar. While chair- 
man of RAND's Board of Trustees, he served 
in 1948 and 1949 as the chairman of the 
committee that studied new opportunities 
for the Ford F o u n d a t i ~ n . ~ ~  His important 
report to the trustees reflected the Cold TVar 
world with which RAND was preoccupied. 
It looked for new ways of studying and man- 
aging or stabilizing conflict on behalf of 
American interests and values. It revealed 
how the Cold War affected the Ford Founda- 
tion's thinking about pure and applied 
social science research as it related to con- 
flict and its causes. In other words, the report 
presented the framework within which 
occurred game theory's wartime connection 
with the study of labor relations. It deserves 
closer scrutiny. 
The report proclaimed traditional Xmer- 
ican values in the context of the Cold War. 
Each individual had an inherent worth. 
Human interdependence could be exploited 
by men or states. Faith in the future and 
immediate material benefits served people 
as criteria when choosing between free soci- 
eties and totalitarian ones. The danger from 
abroad was real, the stakes high: "the tide of 
communism mounts in Asia and Europe, 
the position of the United States is crucial. 
. . . This country must be prepared militarily 
for any future eventuality. . . ." At home 
threats to the democratic tradition were also 
serious. Suspicion, hysteria, and expediency 
Indeed, klorgens tern developed working 
23'L'on Neumann and hlorgenstern, Theory of Games papers for the RAND On the (11)53), pp,  vii-viii; rVilliams, The  Compleat Strate- 
theory of strategy and the gyst, pp. 215, 216-17; Rand Corporation, Index to 
logistics of supply, which formed the basis Selected Publzcations of the Rand Corporatzon I :  1946- 
for his 1959 publication, T h e  Question o f  1962 (Santa Monica: Rand, 1962), pp.  3111.17; hlartin 
National Defense. Shubik developed papers Shubik (with John hlash and J .  P .  hlayberl.y), "A 
Comparison of Treatments of a Duopoly Situation," 
(with K. H .  Arrow and T. E. ~ a r r i s ) ,  " ~ p t i m a l  In- 
22D~vight Macdonald, The Ford Foundation: The  ventory Policy," and (with M. R. Mickey, Jr.), "Notes 
Men and the 1Millions (New York: Reynal, 1956), on the Optional Choice of Weapons," all in Rand, 
pp .  8-11; Smith, Rand, pp. 39-111; "Air Force Forms Index, pp. P-222, P-189, P-470; Smith, Rand, p.  157. 
. . . 'RAND Corporation' . . ., New York Times, No- See also Herman Kahn and Anthony IViener, The 
vember 5, 1948, Late City Edition, p. 13; S. Ulam, Year 2000 (Nelv York: Macmillan, 196'7), pp.  35-36. 
"John von Neumann," pp. 235-48. 24Macdonald, Ford, p.  11. 
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abounded as citizens feared treason and 
jeopardized freedom. The country's conduct 
must not be "based solely upon fear of com- 
munism, upon reactions to totalitarian 
tactics, or upon the immediate exigencies of 
avoiding war. . . . We may grow like the 
thing we fight."25 
The report identified unrest and social 
instability as the basic cause of war and ap- 
preciated the centrali ty of a strong and stable 
American economy in rehabilitating "free 
countries of the world" andin withstanding 
"totalitarian pressures" against them.26 But 
having so diagnosed the interrelatedness of 
domestic and foreign affairs, Gaither et al. 
insisted that the social sciences had neither 
the theories nor methods necessary for cop- 
ing with the complex problems of the Cold 
War. In economics theoretical thinking 
needed support for developing techniques 
such as sampling and intellectual ap- 
proaches that recognized that "man's eco- 
nomic behavior is only a part of his total 
behavior." Man's economic choices were 
recognized as constituting simply one part 
of the entire range of human choices and 
decisions subject "as much to nonlogical 
factors as any other human conduct." 
Similar support was needed for newer disci- 
plines such as psychology, sociology, and 
anthropology, but all these disciplines were 
simply incapable of providing the scientifi- 
cally reliable and verifiable knowledge 
necessary for identifying the causes of con- 
flict: "The study of human and social be- 
havior does not have a long and established 
tradition of scientific research. Much of the 
work in these fields has been polemical, 
speculative, and prescientif i~."~~ 
Collective bargaining and industrial 
conflict at home and abroad needed compar- 
able attention, for a scientific understand- 
ing of such subjects was a prerequisite for 
maintaining strong free economies against 
totalitarianism. The absence of industrial 
peace resulted in lost income, inconveni- 
ence, and social friction. "Substantial prog- 
ress in solving this problem requires a more 
25H. Rowan Gaither, Jr., et al., Report  of the  Study 
for the  Ford Foundatzon o n  Poltcy and Program (De- 
troit: Ford Foundation, 1949), pp. 17, 19-22,26,28-29. 
261bid., pp. 26, 71. 
Tb id . ,  pp. 72,74,92-96; Macdonald, Ford, p p  80-81. 
complete knowledge of what constitutes 
effective organization and administration 
in business firms and unions, and a more 
complete understanding of human be- 
havior." The report pinpointed two targets 
especially. Contracts between a powerful 
union and a large firm presented important 
concerns because they involved techno- 
logical change and other important public 
issues such as mobility of workers and regu- 
larity of employment. The other target was 
the trade union itself: it represented and 
governed workers but did not always rnain- 
tain responsible governments devoted to 
rules of justice for its members or the general 
public. T o  Gaither et al. it was obvious that 
here as elsewhere in the social sciences, 
increased knowledge of human behavior 
would be of great value in solving such 
economic problems as those encountered in 
labor-management relations.28 
Through different forms of financial 
support Ford translated into action the 
emphasis of the report. One form, in applied 
research, went to Clark Kerr, John Dunlop, 
Frederick Harbison, and Charles Myers for 
systematic comparative studies of inter- 
national systems of industrial and labor 
relations.29 Other forms allowed the founda- 
tion to bring together those scholars work- 
ing in the areas of social science research the 
Gaither report had identified as important. 
One of these groups was associated with the 
University of Michigan and was to have a 
special place in the study of conflict and 
labor relations. 
2Gaither,  Report ,  p. 35. 
29The relation of their study to the Cold War.features 
of the Gaither report can be appreciated by comparing 
prefaces of the 1960 and 1964 editions of Industrialzsm 
and Industrial Man .  In 1960, on page 4, they reported 
on their justification when they first applied for funds. 
It includes this passage which they excised from the 
1964 preface: ". . . we pointed out that effective opera- 
tion [abroad] was particularly important to Ameri- 
cans, since the world is torn bet~veen two great ap- 
proaches to the organization of industrial society." 
Clark Kerr, John T. Dunlop, Frederick Harbison, and 
Charles Myers, Industrialzsm and Indus t r~a l  M a n  
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 4-5 
and (Ye\+, York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 
5-6. See also James L. Cochrane, "Industrialism and 
Industrial hlan in Retrospect," in Industrial Rela- 
tions Research Association, Proceedzngs of the  
T w e n t y - N i n t h  Annua l  Wznter Meeting, September 
16-28, 1976, pp. 274-87. 
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The Michigan Connection 
Between 1949 and 1954, in the midst of 
the Cold War and at the height of Senator 
Joseph McCarthy's anti-Communist and 
anti-Russian scare campaigns, a number of 
scholars sharing pacifist attitudes found 
each other. They met at the University of 
Michigan and in Palo Alto, the new home of 
the Ford Foundation's Center for Advanced 
Study in the Behavioral Sciences. All social 
and biological scientists, they, too, looked 
for new ways of thinking to prevent war. 
In Ann Arbor, Viennese-born Herbert 
Kelman, a young social psychologist, and 
Kenneth E. Boulding, a Quaker pacifist 
and economist, attracted likeminded col- 
leagues to the subject of conflict resolution. 
Kelman sparked successful efforts to pub- 
lish a new bulletin for exchanging research 
information and for holding workshops on 
the subject of their enthusiasm. "We were 
amateurs responding to moral issues of the 
day in seeking to apply our social scientific 
tools to problems of war and peace," recalled 
Kelman years later.30 
By the time Boulding joined the Michi- 
gan faculty he had already started moving 
toward "general systems."31 By his own ac- 
count his intellectual direction had been 
most affected by the works of three authors 
whose subjects "all lie outside the regular 
academic disciplines. " 
They are first, the pioneering work of Chester 
Barnard, T h e  F u n c t i o n s  of t h e  Execut ive  119381. 
From this comes the central idea of the executive 
or "central agent" of any organization as a re- 
ceiver of information andan issuer of orders. The 
second ~vork is Norbert Tl'iener's Cybernetics 
[1948]. In this the notion of the executive as the 
center of a control mecha~lism ~vhereby through 
the feedback of information divergences from 
ideal values are corrected, fills out and supple- 
ments the theory of organization of Barnard. The 
third book, [Claude E.] Shannon and [TYarren] 
kl'eaver's T h e  L2.1athematical T h e o r y  of C o m -  
m u n i c a t i o n  [1949], is the bible of information 
theory. The development of a mathematical con- 
cept of information parallels in its importance 
the development of the concepts of mass and 
energy in physics. It has opened up the possi- 
bility of a new and more quantitative approach 
301nterview with Herbert Kelman, May 18, 1976. 
31Letter from Kenneth E. Boulding to Gerd Korman, 
August 27, 1975. 
to the whole problem of o r g a n i z a t i ~ n . ~ ~  
At Michigan, Boulding combined this in- 
terest with his devotion to pacifism. He or- 
ganized a seminar on "The Integration of 
the Social Sciences." This, he recalled, 
"turned out to be a seminar on any thing that 
wanted to be integrated, and eventually led 
into general systems."33 It had also led to 
contacts with Ludwig Bertalanffy who, on 
the basis of his studies in biology, as early as 
1945 had revealed his movement toward an 
abstract field of  stud^^ called "general sys- 
tems theory 
In Palo Alto in 1954 (the year of Robert 
Oppenheimer's ouster from the Atomic 
Energy Commission, an agency on which 
von Neumann also served) Kelman, Bould- 
ing, and Bertalanffy came together with 
likeminded scholars-Clyde Kluckholn, 
Harold Laswell and Paul Lazarsfeld-for a 
year of study. They had been selected by 
screening groups under the aegis of Chi- 
cago's Bernard Berelson, a quantifier of 
behavior and head of the foundation's Be- 
havioral Science Division. Also selected was 
Anatole Rapoport, a mathematical biolo- 
gist with intellectual interests and moral 
values that easily attracted him to the Michi- 
ganders. Together these scholars looked for 
ways to develop general systems to help 
them understand and analyze their subjects 
of interest, and to find technical tools (such 
as game theory) for studying situations of 
conflict. 
It was in Palo Alto that Rapoport, Bould- 
jng, and Bertalanffy decided to launch their 
society for general systems; a few7 years later, 
under the editorship of Bertalanffy and 
Rapoport, the society began to publish its 
annual volumes. Rapoport also became in- 
volved with the ideas behind the Michigan 
32Kenneth E. Boulding, T h e  Image (Ann Arbor: 
University of RIichigan Press, 1956), p.  153. 
33Boulding to Korman. 
34Bertalanffy's work is described in  Nagel, Structure 
of Science, pp.  432-33; Paul  A. ll'eiss, "The Living 
System: Determinism Stratified," in  Arthur Koestler 
and J .  R.  Smythies, eds., T h e  Alpbach S y m p o s i u m  
1968: Beyond Reduct ionzsm,  N e w  Perspectives i n  the  
Life Sciences (New York: hIacmillan, 1969), pp.  14, 17; 
T .  51. Sonneborn, "The Role of the Genes in  Cyto- 
plasmic Inheritance," in  Dunn,  Genetics i n  the  
Twen t i e th  Century,  p p .  308-1 1. 
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bulletin. He was especially interested in the 
psychological aspects of game theory, but 
more importantly he, too, held strong moral 
judgments against war. Kelman, Boulding, 
and Rapoport began serious discussions for 
establishing a major journal that would 
subsume the bulletin Kelman had started. 
Shortly after Palo Alto, Rapoport went to 
Michigan; there, these three plus some grad- 
uate students, tried to combine models of 
mathematics and systems analysis in the 
study of conflict.35 They were convinced that 
the "behavior and interactions of nations 
are not an isolated self-contained area of 
empirical material but part of a much wider 
field of behavior and interaction." Accord- 
ing to Boulding, they began with the prem- 
ise that "in order to develop a theoretical 
system adequate to deal with the problems 
of war and peace, it is necessary to cast the 
net wider and to study conflict as a general 
social process of which war was a special 
case."36 In 1957 the Michigan group estab- 
lished the Journal of Conflzct Resolutzon. 
Through it and the Center for Research of 
Conflict Resolution, founded two years 
later, the Michigan scholars-Boulding 
called them "peacenicks"- tried to translate 
their moral concerns into systematic studies 
of conflict. T o  them this study approach 
differed from the operational one they 
thought was in vogue at RAND. They ac- 
quired important help from Steven Rich- 
ardson, the son of Lewis F. Richardson-an 
English physicist and Quaker pacifist- 
who made available his father's scientific 
papers and unpublished manuscripts on 
war and pea~e .3~  
Initially in the drive for developing an 
integrated theory of conflict, the group was 
especially interested in labor relations. 
Boulding's interest in labor economics 
reached back to 1943 when Iowa State Col- 
lege at Ames gave him a year off to study the 
subject. He "read very extensively in the 
35Boulding, Image, p.  162; Boulding to Korman; 
inteniew with Kelman; Macdonald, Ford, pp.  80-83. 
36Editorial in  Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 
1, No. 1 (March 1955), p p .  1-2; Boulding to Korman. 
37Boulding to Korman; interview with Kelman. T h e  
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 1, No. 3 was 
devoted to Lewis F. Richardson; Rapoport served as 
guest editor of the volume. 
field . . . [and] visited the offices of 85 inter- 
national unions." He examined the pro- 
ceedings of all the conventions that he could 
find, and recalled "visiting among the locals 
in Iowa." He never wrote much about the 
subject but his experience affected him pro- 
foundly: "I always say that going to Ames to 
become a labor economist was what really 
ruined me as a pure economist and led even- 
tually to general system~."3~ The first vol- 
ume of the Journal of Conflict Resolution 
reflected the group's interest in industrial 
relations. In addition to an article on the 
peaceful settlement of industrial and inter- 
group disputes by Ann Douglas, a young 
student of industrial and labor relations, the 
journal then and later published reviews of 
books discussing collective bargaining, and 
editorially explained the connection be- 
tween labor disputes and international rela- 
tions. More importantly from the perspec- 
tive of the emerging general systems ap- 
proach, the Michigan group recognized the 
relationship between problems of conflict 
resolution, institutional economics in gen- 
eral, and industrial relations in particular. 
The first volume of the journal explained: 
Many of the patterns and processes ~vhich 
characterize conflict in one area also characterize 
it in others. Negotiation and mediation go on in 
labor disputes as well as in international 
relations. Price wars and domestic quarrels have 
much the pattern of an arms race. Frustration 
breeds aggression both in the individual and in 
the state. The jurisdictional problems of labor 
unions and the territorial disputes of states are 
not dissimilar. It is not too much to claim that 
out of the contributions of many fields, a general 
theory of conflict is emerging.39 
That interest, however, was short-lived. 
Llrhen Ms. Douglas "dropped out of sight," 
remembered Boulding, "there was nobody 
38Boulding to Korman. 
39Editorial in Journal of Conflzct Resolutzon, 1'01. 1, 
No. 1 (March 1957), p .  2; Ann Douglas, "The Peaceful 
Settlement of Industrial and Intergroup Disputes," 
Journal of Conflzct Resolution, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp .  69- 
81; Jesse Berrard, (an  article entitled) "Paging Arnold 
Toynbeel -A Review of [several volumes], "Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 1'01. 12, No. 1 (March 1968), p p .  
113-19. Occasionally articles on  labor-management 
conflict wouldalso appear: see, for example, Vol. 3, No. 
2 ( June  1959), pp .  116-52; 1.01. 9, No. 1 (March 1965), 
p p .  118-26; Vol. 11, No. 4 (December 1967), p p .  398-113. 
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else to pursue the interest." Boulding, the 
Quaker pacifist, did not provide a link to 
industrial and labor relations because his 
primary interest had shifted to applying 
mathematical systems to the peaceful solu- 
tion of international conflicts.40 
Wider Circles 
Thus,  von Neumann, Morgenstern, 
Boulding, Rapoport, Bertalanffy, RAND, 
and the people around the Journal of Con- 
flict Resolution had not directly affected 
bargaining theory in the world of industrial 
and labor relations. Game and general sys- 
tems theory had continued to attract mili- 
tary planners, biologists, biochemists, and 
international conflict specialists, however, 
and through operatio& research and sys- 
tems analysis corporation managements 
also continued to play an important part in 
uses of these tools andconcepts.41 In general, 
though, lines of thought about bargaining 
in the domain of industrial and labor rela- 
tions remained traditional. 
T o  be sure, there were exceptions. Dunlop 
was another economist who, like Boulding, 
sensed an affinity between general systems 
theory and the actual behavior of people in 
unions, managements, and governments. 
He had been especially persuaded by Talcott 
Parsons, an influential sociologist and 
colleague at Harvard whose originality had 
also been touched by Marshall, the institu- 
tionalists, Edwin Schroedinger, and other 
theoretical thinkers in biology, Harvard's 
physiologist L. H.  Henderson and his inter- 
40Boulding to Korman. 
41D. G. Brennan, "Strategy and Conscience," and 
Anatole Rapoport, "The Sources of Anguish," both in  
Bulle t in  of the  A tomic  Scientists, Vol. 21, No. 10 
(December 1965), pp.  23-30, 31-36; Sir Solly Zucker- 
man, "Judgment and Control in  Modern ll'arfare," 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 40, No. 2 (January 1962), p p .  196- 
212; Michae l  Macoby, "Social Psychology of 
Deterrence," Bulle t in  of the  A tomic  Scientists, Vol. 17, 
No. 7 (September 1961), pp .  278-81; Arthur ll'askow, 
";\merican Military Doctrine," in  Seymour Melman, 
ed., Disarmament (Boston: American Academy of Arts 
and Sciences, 1962), pp.  193-211, (quotation from p .  
207). See also Bruce Wallace, "On Decision Making," 
"Brinksmanship: T h e  Limits of Game Theory," and 
"Reaching a Simple Decision," all in Bruce ll'allace, 
ed., Essays i n  Social Biology, Vol. 1: People, The i r  
Needs, Environment ,  Ecology (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1972), pp .  89-91, 157-38, 230-36. 
est in the Italian economics and sociologist 
Vilfredo Pareto.42 As Dart of the Ford-funded 
study in comparative international indus- 
trial and labor relations, Dunlop declared 
that "an economic systemcan be regardedas 
a subsystem of the more general total sys- 
tem," and stated that an "industrial rela- 
tions system is not a subsidiary part of an 
economic system but is rather a separate and 
distinctive subsvstem of the societv, on the 
same plane as the economic system." He 
defined the structure of an industrial rela- 
tions system in terms of its political, social, 
and economic content, the establishment of 
rules, the formation of an ideology, and the 
behavior of its actors.43 
When Dunlop published his Industrial 
Relations Systems in 1938, the Manichean 
years were beginning to come to an end. As 
Eisenhower had been a s~okesman on behalf 
of a military-industrial-academic complex 
so, too, was he to become symbolic, as re- 
tiring president, of the changes beginning to 
occur. In his famous Farewell Address he 
echoed sentiments expressed eleven years 
earlier in the Gaither report, even as it had 
urged the Ford Foundation to contribute to 
the complex. Eisenhower pointed to an 
important development in the republic 
since the end of World War 11. "This con- 
junction of an immense military establish- 
ment and a large arms industry is new in the 
American experience." Eisenhower said this 
was in large part the result of "the techno- 
logical revolution during recent decades. 
[in which] research has become central. 
. the solitary inventor . . . has been over- 
shadowed by task forces . . . in laboratories 
and testing'fields. . . . the free university, 
historically the fountainhead of free ideas 
and scientific discovery, has experienced a 
revolution in the conduct of research . . . . 
[and] a Government contract has become 
virtually a substitute for intellectual curi- 
osity." In the Manichean years the change 
had gone so far as to create danger: "public 
42For Parsons, see his "On Building Social System 
Theory: ;\ Personal History," Daedalus, Vol. 99, No. 4 
(Fall 197O), pp .  826-81; John  T .  Dunlop, Industrial 
Relations System (New York: Holt-Dryden, 1938), 
pp .  4-3. 
43Dunlop, Industrial Relations System, pp.  4-3, 
7-18. 
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policy could itself become the captive of a 
scientific-technological elite." He called 
for a national alert warning against the Cold 
War's impact upon the life of "every city, 
every statehouse, every office of the Federal 
Government. "44 In other words, he had 
come to fear the special set of circumstances 
that had made behavioral science and gen- 
eral systems theory appear so potent for 
understanding and managing conflict. 
In these same years game theory out of 
RAND also underwent changes, which 
helped make it possible for some within the 
tent of industrial and labor relations to ad- 
mit a variant breed of the von Neumann- 
Morgenstern camel. Scholars in RAND, and 
the Michigan group, each in their own way 
contributed to the cleansing process making 
game theory more useful than it had been 
when von Neumann and Morgenstern first 
introduced it. Formal criticism of game 
theory and experience with it at RAND and 
Michigan revealed all sorts of problems. 
RAND strategists used it less than before: 
instead, "war gaming, a dynamic simula- 
tion process," became a common technique. 
Their Cold War concepts about Russian and 
American designs also became less Mani- 
chean. They recognized the "central truth 
. . . that many of the goals of the Soviet Un- 
ion conflict with those of the United S tates," 
said D. G. Brennan, expressing a view 
shared by Henry Kissinger and such other 
important strategists as Thomas Schelling 
and Herman Kahn. But by this time it did 
not "appear that any of these conflicting 
goals are such as both of us would be pre- 
pared to support by going to war."15 
Behaviorists also helped to ease the camel 
of game theory into the tent of industrial and 
labor relations. Some scholars representing 
disciplines in the Industrial Relations Re- 
search Association had started to grapple 
with bargaining problems. They tended to 
associate themselves with the subject matter 
in Human Behavzor, the encyclopedic guide 
to behavioral science of which Bernard 
44The Farewell Address of January 18, 1961 may 
be found in James L. Clayton, ed., T h e  Economic 
Impact of the Cold War (New York: Harcourt, Brace 
and World, 1970), pp. 241-44. 
45Brennan and Rapoport, Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, pp. 27-28. 
Berelson was senior compiler. Previously, 
as the director of the Ford Foundation's 
Behavioral Science Division, Berelson had 
done much to stimulate initial interests 
among social scientists in the border zone 
between economics and behavioral science. 
Economists who worked as behaviorists in 
that zone tended to agree that Zeuthen had 
in fact elucidated the essence of the bargain- 
ing process. Jan Pen insisted that "Hicks' 
reasoning is all about the limits of the con- 
tract zone and explains nothing of what 
happens between these l imit~."~6 G.L.S. 
Shackle denied Hicks the right to assume 
that each party possessed complete knowl- 
edge of the other: "determinancy of the 
price is only secured at the sacrifice of the 
essence of bargaining, namely, the interplay 
of threat, bluff, and deception, the endeavor 
to trade upon the adversary's uncertainty. "47 
The effectiveness of a threat was seen as a 
function of the adversary's estimate of the 
risk attached to ignoring it. Assumptions 
like that, plus a stress on the tactics involved 
in making rational choices, became the 
foundation tools of those theoreticians who, 
by incorporating statistical and mathemati- 
cal techniques into economic thought, 
attempted to limit the scope of rationality in 
bargaining along a situational continuum 
that purported to be rational. 
It is the special relationship between 
Boulding and Schelling in these years be- 
tween 1957 and 1960, however, that reveals 
especially well the process that brought 
game theory out of RAND and toward stu- 
dents of labor relations. Each man was un- 
usual. Boulding, by himself, had broken out 
of the confines of traditional scholarly dis- 
ciplines, in part because of the Center of 
Conflict Resolution he helped to establish 
at Michigan, but also because of his own far- 
ranging interests. He examined subjects 
related to the bargaining theories of both 
industrial and international relations. He 
commented upon theories of bilateral mon- 
46Jan Pen, "A General Theory of Bargaining," 
American Economic Reuieu', Vol. 42, No. 1 (RIarch 
1952), pp. 23-36. 
47G.L.S. Shackle, "The Nature of the Bargaining 
Process," in John T .  Dunlop, T h e  Theory of Wage 
Determination (London: The Macmillan Co., 1937), 
p. 313. 
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opoly, the limits of profit maximization, 
the strategic complexities of game theory, 
and the relationship among expectations 
and uncertainty and risk. As an outgrowth 
of "a passionate conviction" that "war was 
the major moral and intellectual problem 
of our age," he struggledwith theories about 
war and peace in international relations; in 
his theoretical work, however, he included 
an essay on industrial conflict in order to 
develop his model of international conflict. 
He explained the exclusion of a more 
lengthy consideration of industrial rela- 
tions by asserting that much of the ground- 
work had already been prepared: 
Industrial conflict is . . . a curiously ambivalent 
affair, closer to the domestic battle of the sexes 
than to the clash of armies. Consequently, it is 
not difficult to build upon the positive sum or 
cooperative aspects of the game and to develop 
institutions that express this aspect. This 
perhaps is 1vhy the union, which may have been 
originally devised to prosecute conflict, ma) in 
cases become an instrument to resolve it in a way, 
for instance, that an army never does.48 
It had seemed that Boulding in Michigan 
was alone in choosing to study industrial 
and international relations in a separate but 
related fashion; but, in fact, Schelling was 
cutting across his path. He submitted to 
Boulding an article on "Bargaining in the 
Absence of Communication Among Bar- 
g a i n e r ~ . " ~ ~  Boulding remembered that he 
accepted the piece with "great enthusiasm 
and encouraged him to go on with it"; under 
a different title he published the paper in 
1957; a year later he published Schelling's 
"The Strategy of Conflict: Prospectus for a 
Reorientation of Game Theory," a paper 
Schelling had sent to the Michigan group 
from RAND, where he was then a fellow.50 
Rapoport and Kelman shared this respect 
for Schelling in spite of the moral tension 
48Kenneth E. Boulding, A Reconstruction of Eco- 
nomics (New York: il'iley, 1950), pp .  60, 67-71, 81-82, 
99-101, 117-33,223; Kenneth E,  Boulding, Conflict and 
Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper, 1962), 
p. viii (quotation from p .  226). 
49Boulding to Korman. 
5OThomas Schelling, "Bargaining, Communication 
and Limited il'ar," Journal of Conflzct Resolution, 
1'01. 1, No. 1 (RIarch 1937), pp. 19-36 and "The Strategy 
of Conflict: . . . Game Theory," Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Vol. 2, No. 3 (September 1938), pp. 203-64. 
existing between the military orientation of 
RAND and the pacifist one at Michigan.jl 
In time, in fact, Schelling became especially 
important to students of labor relations. 
Schelling's Contribution 
A professor of economics and an associate 
at Harvard's Cniversity Center for Inter- 
national Affairs, Schelling put forward in 
1960 a theory of bargaining with an integra- 
tive potential: T h e  Strategy of Conflzct. 
This was particularly remarkable because 
of the colleagues he encountered during his 
year at RAND Corporation: theorists who 
advocated mathematical formulae to ex- 
plain the technical aspects of deterrence and 
reconnaissance. After all, the proliferation 
of game theorists was still one of RAND'S 
specialties. Nevertheless, Schelling emerged 
with a strategy of conflict that contended 
that there were "enlightening similarities 
between, say, maneuvering in limited war 
and jockeying in a traffic jam, between de- 
terring the Russians and deterring one's 
own children, or between the modern bal- 
ance of terror and the ancient institution of 
hos tages."j2 
Schelling transcended Boulding by in- 
corporating similarities into his theoretical 
exposition that the latter merely drew upon 
by allusion.53 The subject matter of Schel- 
ling's book could be construed as game 
theory; but he concentrated upon situations 
in which there was a common interest as 
well as conflict between adversaries. It was 
precisely among these variations of the ne- 
gotiating problem that game theory had, up 
to that point, made the least progress. 
The distinction between explicit bargain- 
ing and tacit bargaining, in which knowl- 
edge of the adversary is reasonably complete, 
was one of the most important subtleties in 
Schelling's discussion. He explained that 
tacit bargaining rnos t of ten required co- 
5lBoulding to Korman, August 27, 1975; interview 
with Kelman. 
52Schelling, Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. v-vi. One of his 
colleagues at  RAND recalled overhearing Schelling 
apply his strategy to his own children's conflicts (Inter- 
view with RIyron Rush,  May 1976). 
53'The discussion of Schelling is based on  the 
Strategy of Conflict, pp.  9-10, 21-46, 54ff., 88-89, 128. 
GAME THEORY AND INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT 
ordination for a common gain while ex- 
plicit bargaining did not. Tacit bargaining, 
therefore, was as applicable to companies 
and unions, which shared a long-term com- 
mitment to avoid conflict, as it was to na- 
tions and families, who shared a similar 
goal in maintaining peace. 
Bargaining power was defined, paradox- 
ically, not as a measure of superior strength, 
intelligence, or financial resources, but as 
the ability to incur a commitment toa given 
position and to communicate it persua- 
sively to the other party. Institutional and 
structural characteristics of negotiations 
were brought to bear on the process. A bar- 
gaining agent might communicate com- 
mitment effectively since he was viewed as a 
party who was bound by predetermined 
instructions. Simultaneous negotiations 
would enable the party who successfully 
arranged such a calendar to argue that a 
concession in one contest would prejudice 
that party's bargaining reputation in other 
contests. The ability to communicate a con- 
vincing promise, as well as a convincing 
threat, was an important contribution to the 
party's bargaining success. 
In discussing game theory, Schelling 
noted that its contribution to international 
strategy had "been extremely helpful in the 
formulation of problems and the clarifica- 
tion of concepts," but on the whole, it had 
"been pitched at a level of abstraction where 
it has made little contact with the elements 
of a problem like deterrence." Schelling 
argued that the "present deficiencies are not 
in the mathematics, and that the theory of 
strategy has suffered from too great a will- 
ingness of social scientists to treat the sub- 
ject as though it were, or should be, solely a 
branch of mathematics." 
In developing a reorientation of game 
theory, Schelling pointed out that the tradi- 
tional references to basic concepts in the 
literature were formed without regard for 
the relationships among the players. Re- 
jecting pure conflict as an abstraction of 
little use in the majority of genuine bargain- 
ing situations, Schelling preferred to deal in 
terms of games of coordination that reflected 
the sharing of interests and mixed-motive 
games in which coexisting elements of 
mutual dependence and conflict had to be 
resolved. Game theory had become endowed 
with pure conflict-oriented connotations, 
and he suggested that a "theory of inter- 
dependent decision" might be a more ap- 
propriately neutral term. 
For students of labor relations another 
strength of the Schelling thesis rested in its 
ability to incorporate diverse stands from 
many of the otherwise isolated disciplines. 
The von Neumann-Morgenstern discus- 
sion had been conspicuously lax in its treat- 
ment of the wage determination contro- 
versies that had preceded it. Although Schel- 
ling devoted a great deal of attention to the 
problems of limited war, nuclear prolifera- 
tion, and deterrence, he showed an equal 
familiarity with the problems of duopoly, 
bilateral monopoly, price war, and eco- 
nomic competition. In spite of his use of 
mathematics to illustrate strategic moves, 
Schelling did not consider it irrelevant to 
stress sociologist Erving Goffman's "nice 
everday" examples as illustrations of the 
relationship "of game theory to gamesman- 
ship and . . . the rich game- theoretic content 
of formalized behavior structures like eti- 
quette, chivalry, diplomatic practice, and- 
by implication- the law. " 
Conclusion 
Events from the Manichean period had 
brought Schelling and Boulding across each 
other's paths to serve in special roles in ap- 
plying game theory to the analysis of indus- 
trial conflict. Carl hl. Stevens, who came out 
of psychological choice theory and studies 
with Dunlop, found Schelling "on bargain- 
ing theory and on reoriented game theory a 
source of stimulation."j4 There were others 
as well in industrial and labor relations 
who benefited from the hlanichean period's 
special affinity to problems of international 
conflict. (In Bargaznzng: Formal Theorzes of 
hregotiatzons, Oran Young's bibliograph- 
ical references to those years stand as a silent 
tribute.55) 
But the work of \Valton and McKersie 
S4Carl M. Stevens, Strategy and Collectzue Bargal~z- 
ing  Negotiatzon (Sew York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), 
p. xiii. 
550ran Young, Bargazning: Formal Theorzes of 
Negotiations (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1975), pp. 409-12. 
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best illustrates the point, for their work was 
an excellent example of the sort of social 
scientific orientation the Gaither report had 
advocated. They rested their book on von 
Neumann and Morgenstern and on the sort 
of studies that the Ford Foundation had 
financed since the establishment of the 
KAND Corporation. They had three touch- 
stones: "the field of study of collective 
bargaining; the emerging field of conflict 
resolution; and the underlying disciplines 
of economics, psychology, and sociology." 
They wrote for three different audiences. 
For students and teachers of industrial rela- 
tions "we have attempted to close the gap 
between . . . empirical case studies. . . and the 
literature on bilateral monopoly, decision 
theory, experimental games, small group 
problem solving, attitude change, and role 
conflict." For social scientists "interested in 
the general field of conflict resolution we 
have attempted to show the fruitfulness of a 
more or less exhaustive treatment of a spec- 
ific type of conflict-resolution process in 
one setting, . . . negotiations andlabor man- 
agement." For practitioners of collective 
bargaining and other persons who are di- 
rectly involved in international negotia- 
tions and civil rights negotiations, "we have 
attempted a comprehensive enumeration 
of tactical behaviors." 
Finally, Walton and McKersie's A Be- 
havzoral Theory of Labor Negotzatzons was 
also a work shaped by the Manichean char- 
acter of those years. In 1964, when they 
offered their book as a contribution to sci- 
ence and society, they turned to Boulding 
and the other editors of the Journal of Con- 
flict Resolutzon for their expression of faith: 
. . . we welcome insights, theoretical models, 
and confirmatory tests from all spheres of conflict 
resolution; for we believe that only as all such 
areas are drawn on, can we devise an intellectual 
engine of sufficient power to move the greatest 
problem of our time-the prevention of ~ a r . ~ 6  
After 1964, the republic's Manichean 
years gave way to a period more akin to that 
for which institutional economists had 
developed their approaches and meth0ds.5~ 
56Journal of Conflzct Resolutzon, Vol. 1, S o .  1 
(March 1957), p. 2 quoted in IValton and McKersie, A 
Behavioral Theory, pp. 2-3; see also pp.  vii-viii, 6-10. 
57The subsequent statements in this paragraph are 
LlThen Peking broke with Moscow the per- 
ceived bipolar politics of the 1940s and 1950s 
started to make way for a succession of mul- 
tiple centers of power. The Gulf of Tonkin 
resolution served the Johnson administra- 
tion as justification for sending drafted 
combat troops into battle zones of Vietnam's 
war, which neither Russia nor China 
seemed capable of controlling. For many 
Americans the war "for" South Vietnam, 
but against neither Moscow nor Peking, 
became an unpopular one. In the mean- 
while the drive for equal opportunity at 
home had fashioned coalitions making 
forceful demands on government at all 
levels of the republic. As a result of these 
events at home and abroad, domestic con- 
flicts became intense and violent. The 
mushrooming of public employment and 
ethnic and female power consciousness 
exacerbated some of these competitive strug- 
gles and sustained others after the shrillest 
voices had been stilled by Richard Nixon's 
resignation and the defeat in Vietnam. Con- 
flicts of interest among competing groups of 
free citizens appeared as complex as they had 
been before "measuring social scientists" 
had come upon the scene. The problem of 
shaping public policy in response to those 
citizens and their interests also remained 
as difficult as ever. 
It appears that game theory's wartime 
connections had facilitated its application 
to the study of labor relations during a 
unique period. Much more study of these 
years of hot and cold war is surely necessary 
in order to evaluate properly their signifi- 
cance in the history of industrial and labor 
relations. It is clear, however, that in the 
Manichean years fear of ideological or mili- 
tary defeat, or fear of war itself, had served as 
a powerful catalyst for findingways to apply 
mathematical theory and statistics in order 
to make social science more systematic, 
based on a context identified in the following: Zbig- 
niew Brrezinski, "Threat and Opportunity in the 
Communist Schism," Forezgn Affairs, Vol. 41, No. 3 
(April 1963), pp. 513-25; William E.  Leuchtenburg, 
"The Travail of Liberalism: American Society 1961 to 
the Present," in Leuchtenburg, et al., T h e  Cnfznished 
Century, pp. 803-938. Lloyd C. Gardner, Walter F. 
LaFeber, and Thomas J .  >lcCormick, Creation of the 
American Empire (New York: Rand hlcSally, 1973), 
pp.  423-93. 
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reliable, and predictable. Game theory 
offered one important contribution to that 
transformation, and in that context game 
theory was applied, tested, criticized, and 
made suitable for students of labor relations 
who also wanted to use statistics or mathe- 
matics in their field. 
It is also clear that game theory, and the 
statistical thinking associated with it, be- 
came a permanent part of the study of labor 
relations during a period when, especially 
in mass-production industry, much of what 
peculiarly characterized contemporary 
industrial and labor relations entrenched 
itself in American society. Most arbitrators 
influential in labor relations since World 
War I1 had received their training with the 
War Labor Board or other hot and cold war 
agencies that had sought to stabilize indus- 
trial and labor relations. The grievance 
procedure, culminating in compulsory 
arbitration, was a wartime product in the 
sense that it received an extraordinary push 
from the federal government, eager to stabi- 
lize conflict, and from citizens who feared 
industrial unrest as a prelude to radicalism 
and Communism. Congress's Taft-Hartley 
and Landrum-Griffin Acts and the Supreme 
Court's Steelworkers' Trilogy decisions 
became the law of the land.58 
Finally, it seems useful to point out that 
even though "measuring social scientists" 
have increased in importance in the study of 
58The remarks about the grievance procedure and 
arbitration are based on a study Gerd Kolman is prepar- 
ing for publication. 
industrial and labor relations since 1964, 
more of them now seem prepared to ac- 
knowledge unwarranted presumptuousness 
about the complex subjects they examine 
or seek to affect in shaping public policy. 
T o  be sure, assumptions about humanists 
and experimental physical scientists con- 
tinue to shape the conviction that the 
quantifier is the most rigorous of investi- 
gators and therefore the most reliable of 
guides to knowledge and understanding. 
But, even as they criticized institutionalists 
for concentrating on descriptive detail and 
case studies, some quantifiers sounded a 
modest note: "Too often we have been con- 
tent to derive our hypotheses and estimate 
our regressions in at least a partial vacuum 
of knowledge about the institutions with 
which we deal. . . ."59 That  particular ad- 
mission came more than 30 years after The 
Theory of Games was first published. It may 
suggest, symbolically speaking, that von 
Neumann and Morgenstern's camel was 
finding trainers more respectful of tradi- 
tional economics than in the past; after all, 
they had come face to face with complex 
conflict in a republic freed from the con- 
straints of the Manichean period. 
59"Poli~y Decision and Research in Economics and 
Industrial Relations: .An Exchange of Views," Indus-  
trzal and Labor Relat ions  Review,  Vol. 31, S o .  1 
(October 1977), pp. 3-17, quotation from Ronald G.  
Ehrenberg, Daniel S. Hamermesh, and George E. 
Johnson, "Comment," page 12. See also "Social 
Science: The Public Disenchantment, A Symposium," 
Amerzcan Scholar, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Summer 1976), pp. 
335-39. 
